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The argument from disagreement. When A uses S and B uses its negation, they can be reported as disagreeing by saying A and B disagree about whether S. This is evidence that the content of S is constant across contexts. But in many such cases we have strong intuitions that the original uses are both true. Ascribing relativistic content to S explains this best.
If one changes the argument above by having Beth tell the truth as she sees it (and ascribes truth to Mary and Beth's utterances), one gets a version of this argument.
CH object to the argument from same-saying. They point out that there are many cases in which it is implausible to think that the report involved in the argument is a report that for some p, each speaker said p. Example: Kavalier in the Village utters 'a local bar serves Absinthe'; so does Clay on 125 th Street; each means a bar local to him and his audience. Kavalier and Clay said that a local bar serves Absinthe, but, it would seem, the contents of their utterances are different. As CH observe, in cases like this an appeal to variable binding, perhaps involving unphoneticized lambda abstraction, provides an economical explanation of how X and Y said that S may be true without there being some p such that X and Y each said p.
3
I wonder how many theorists have been led to relativism by anything like the argument from same-saying. CH ascribe 'variations on this line of thought' to Lepore (2003, 2004) , Hawthorne (2004) , Richard (2004) , Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005) , MacFarlane (2005 MacFarlane ( , 2007 , and Stanley (2005) . 4 Cappelen and
Hawthorne have authority about their own past intentions. For myself, I have to say that even a cursory reading of Richard 2004 makes it clear that it does not rely on this line of argument; it is clear from its first pages that the motivation for relativism about (for example) what's said using an adjective like 'rich' is the fact that we perceive speakers in different conversations (with different standards of wealth) who differ over the truth of 'Mary is rich' to disagree as to whether Mary is rich.
5
CH do not really object to the argument from disagreement as an argument for relativistic content. But they do criticize a third kind of argument for relativism, and one might think that some of their remarks about this third argument show something As CH go on to observe, there seems to be every reason to think that the sort of thing just discussed might happen in a case in which sentence T = sentence U. And if so, so much the worse for the argument from agreement. CH think their observation is "particularly pertinent" to certain cases in which one may might argue for relativistic content:
Suppose a reporter is observing two people, Joe Coach and Joe Normal. Joe
Coach is a basketball coach who is reluctant to apply 'tall' to people, and indeed predicates 'tall' of someone only when that person is over 6 feet 8 inches tall. Joe
Normal … happily applies 'tall' to anyone over 6 feet tall. It will not seem very natural for the observer to claim that Joe Coach and Joe Normal disagree about think your criteria for wealth are defective and that in fact Mary is not rich. Thinking that my criteria are better than yours, I think that your belief ought be evaluated relative to my criteria. In such a case it will be sensible for me to evaluate your belief relative to them.
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In a case like this -in which there is single perspective relative to which it is sensible to evaluate both your belief that Mary is rich and my belief that she is not -we disagree. To say that x and y disagree is to say that there is a content p such that one of x and y believes it, the other believes its denial, and there is a circumstance relative to which it is appropriate to evaluate both x's belief and y's belief. CH press other examples against the relativist to which the last section's discussion is relevant. For example, they complain that a "blanket relativist" about judgments of taste -by which (I think) they mean someone who holds that a literal interpretation of any sentence of the form a is F (is F a taste predicate) has a relativistic content -makes "unacceptable predictions about contradictoriness". For example
We have no intuition of contradiction when a child says 'The summer will be fun' on account of getting to go to a music camp and a parent, in a separate conversation, says 'The summer won't be fun' on account of having to work overtime to pay for the music camp for the child. (122) I suggested above that there is a difference between people's having beliefs or making assertions that are incompatible and their disagreeing with one another. I would likewise suggest that we allow that people can have views that are incompatible or make assertions that are incompatible without their contradicting one another. In this regard, note how our judgments seem to sort themselves. We would say that the parent thinks exactly the opposite of what the child does, and so they have incompatible beliefs about the summer. Nonetheless, we do not think the parent is contradicting the child. I would say that this is because it is clear that the parent's claim is not supposed to apply to -to be evaluated within -the child's perspective.
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I suggested in the last section that what one wants from an account of judgments of taste is an explanation of how such an assessment of the parent and the child is coherent. I think a relativist account offers the beginning of such an explanation; I don't see that there is a viable alternative in the sort of contextualism that CH endorse.
Ascriptions of Relativistic Content. CH assume that most relativists want to say (for example) that if Cassius and Brutus each assert
(c) Mark Richard 2011. Please Cite published pagination.
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Volturius believes that cooked okra is delicious 'those assertions cannot vary in truth value according to the differences in operative standards of taste' between the contexts of Brutus and Cassius' utterances. (15) CH assume this because they think that the relativist wants to say that (ignoring tense, conventional demonstratives, and indexicals) whatever relativity the content of P may have, that relativity is not inherited by the predicate believes that P. The idea behind this assumption -which is indeed part of standard versions of relativism -is that relativistic content is often the object of attitudes like belief and assertion, and (when P has such content) the predicate believes that P is a vehicle for ascribing belief in P's content. They call this idea the non-relativity of belief.
CH think it will be hard for relativists to maintain anything like this idea; as a result they wonder how the relativist will explain attitude ascriptions in which expressions with relativistic content occur. They give an example that is supposed to make it puzzling how a relativist can hold onto the non-relativity of belief. Here is a variant of the example: Cassius and Brutus find cooked okra disgusting; Volturius finds it delicious. Cassius thinks there is okra in the gumbo, Brutus does not. Because of this last disagreement, Brutus says to Volturius
Cassius thinks you'll find something delicious in the gumbo, but I don't.
As CH observe, the felicity of this does not seem to be explained by anything at all like non-relativity of belief. to the claim that the local music scene is terrific. When something like this is so -that is, when x's beliefs and the conversation's presuppositions allow an easy inference to some p that is conversationally relevant -we often allow ourselves to say x thinks that p.
Whether such utterances are strictly true or just felicitous shorthand is a matter we don't need to settle here.
A related but slightly different example. Suppose Caesar thinks of Cinna and
Casca as his friends, but Cassius and I think they are false friends. Caesar knows we think this, but it's never discussed; when relevant in a conversation between Caesar and one of us, all allow it to be assumed that Cinna and Casca are friends of Caesar. Caesar wants to know where his friends (= Cinna and Casca) are. I know that Cassius thinks that Cinna and Casca are at the Senate; I think one of them might be at the baths. I say Cassius thinks your friends are at the Senate, but I'm not so sure.
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Again, this is perfectly felicitous. I would explain the felicity of this example using the same principle we used above: There is something Cassius thinks -that Cinna and Casca are at the Senate -which when combined with conversational presuppositions -that Cinna and Casca are friends of Caesar's -allows an easy inference to something conversationally relevant -that Caeser's friends Cinna and Casca are at the Senate. So by the principle invoked above I can ascribe belief in the conversationally relevant thing to
Cassius. 16 Note that the second premises in the inference is only required to be a conversational presupposition -it is not something that I am required to believe (or, for (c) Mark Richard 2011. Please Cite published pagination.
that matter, that Cassius is required to believe, or that Caesar is required to believe I believe). Conversational presuppositions are things that conversants assume (and assume other conversants assume) for the purposes of the conversation.
At this point, it should be clear what I think we should say about CH's original example. In its natural fleshings out Brutus makes his remarks about the gumbo in a conversation in which it is presupposed that he knows Volturius' taste in vegetables and wants to be helpful. In this case it is enormously plausible to think that it will be presupposed that what Volturius thinks is delicious is indeed delicious. Making such a presupposition is of a piece with doing things like going along for the conversational ride with Caesar in presupposing that Cinna and Casca are his friends, in order to facilitate conversation. Thus Brutus's original utterance will be felicitous, since it ascribes to
Cassius belief in a claim that is an easy inference from a conversational presuppositionthat okra is delicious -and something the speaker knows Cassius believes -that the gumbo contains okra.
Forget relativism for the moment. Most of us think that a good rule of thumb is that something of the form x believes that P is true in a context in c only if what x names (in c) has a belief with the content of P (in c). But when we are ascribing beliefs, we are in a neighborhood where pragmatics and semantics bang against each other all the time.
For example, the principle discussed in the last three paragraphs will require either that we sharply distinguish truth from felicity (so that my ascriptions to Cassius are felicitous though false) or that we make the truth conditions of attitude ascriptions disjunctive (so that my ascriptions are true though Cassius doesn't have a belief state with the relevant content). The issues here are familiar and have nothing to do with whether some content is relativistic. Precisely the same remarks apply to the principle CH call 'the nonrelativity of belief'. Something very much like that principle is surely true. But there is a lot of noise in the neighborhood, having nothing to do with relativistic content, noise whose sources may require qualifying the principle in various ways. That this is so in no way shows that there is something wrong with the idea that some content is relativistic. 
